A top-only mechanism with reserve price for single-good allocation problem
Aditya Vikram
| Year of publication: |
2022
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Vikram, Aditya |
| Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 217.2022, p. 1-5
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| Subject: | Budget-balanced mechanism | Reserve price | Single-good allocation | Allokation | Allocation | Preismanagement | Pricing strategy | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Preis | Price | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110646 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013465153