A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Study of Low-Carbon Innovation System from the Perspective of Dynamic Rewards and Punishments

A low-carbon innovation system is an important guarantee for achieving high-quality development goals. Under the regulation of the government, enterprises passively participate in low-carbon innovation, but excessive emissions occur from time to time. Aiming at the issue of corporate carbon emission regulation, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among the corporate, government, and public from the perspective of dynamic rewards and punishments. The main results are as follows. (1) Increased incentives and penalties by the government will help enterprises choose low-carbon innovative production strategies, but blindly increasing subsidies is not conducive to the government's choice of regulatory strategies, and strong penalties in a short time are not conducive to the reform of enterprise management systems. (2) Under the static reward and punishment mechanism, the tripartite evolutionary game system finally converges to the stable point of low-carbon innovation of enterprises, no government regulation, and public supervision. under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, it finally converges to low-carbon innovation of enterprises, government regulation, and public supervision The stable point, and the system evolution convergence speed under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism is faster than that under the static scenario. (3) The public's intervention and supervision can effectively prevent the phenomenon of government dereliction of duty and enterprises returning to traditional over-emission production. And the same degree of public rewards and punishments is more effective for the government than for enterprises, so the public can focus on the supervision of the government