Abram Bergson

In this note, we extend the Goyal and Joshi’s model of network of collaboration in oligopoly to multi-market situations. We examine the incentive of firms to form links and the architectures of the resulting equilibrium networks in this setting. We also present some results on efficient networks.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Billand, Pascal ; Bravard, Christophe ; Chakrabarti, Subhadip ; Sarangi, Sudipta
Institutions:	Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Faculté de Sciences Économiques et de Gestion
Subject:	R&D Collaborations \| Network Formation \| Multi-market Oligopolies

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 1339
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L20 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior. General ; D85 - Network Formation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010858021