Abstention as an escape from Arrow's theorem
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Quesada, Antonio |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 25.2005, 1, p. 221-226
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Abstention | Arrow's theorem | Number of voters | Proportion of dictatorial social welfare functions |
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