Accessability and stability of the coalition structure core
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Béal, Sylvain ; Rémila, Eric ; Solal, Philippe |
Published in: |
Mathematical methods of operations research. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-2994, ZDB-ID 1310695-8. - Vol. 78.2013, 2, p. 187-202
|
Subject: | Coalition structure core | Excess function | Payoff configuration | Outsider independent domination | Accessibility | Core stability | Simple games | Veto player | Core | Koalition | Coalition | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game |
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