Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Freixas, Josep ; Tchantcho, Bertrand ; Tedjeugang, Narcisse |
Published in: |
European journal of operational research : EJOR. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0377-2217, ZDB-ID 243003-4. - Vol. 236.2014, 1 (1.7.), p. 254-260
|
Subject: | Game theory | (3, 2) Voting rules | Abstention | Decision support systems | Weightedness and completeness | Hierarchies | Spieltheorie | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Management-Informationssystem | Management information system | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Hierarchie | Hierarchy | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Abstimmungsspiel | Voting game |
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