Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium

This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning to be sequential equilibria. Precisely, we present a set of conditions on learning sequences such that an assessment is a sequential equilibrium if and only if there is a learning sequence fulfilling the conditions, which leads to the assessment

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Groes, Ebbe ; Whitta-Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen ; Sloth, Birgitte
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Lernprozess \| Learning process \| Extensives Spiel \| Extensive form game
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economic Theory, Vol. 13, Iss. 1, 1999 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014206922