Adverse selection in health insurance : are first best contracts impossible

In this note, we intend to characterize conditions such that adverse selection is irrelevant in health insurance. We show that a condition is that policyholders health status is suﬃciently reduced by illness.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Alary, David ; Bien, Franck
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
Subject:	Adverse Selection \| Health insurance \| bivariate utility function \| health status \| optimal contract

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Cahiers de recherche d'EURISCO, 2005
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011073110