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Adverse selection without single crossing : monotone solutions

Christoph Schottmüller (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark)
Year of publication:
July 2015
Authors: Schottmüller, Christoph
Published in:
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 158.2015, p. 127-164
Subject: Spence-Mirrlees condition | Global incentive compatibility | Screening | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Theorie | Theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Signalling | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory
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