Agency contracts, noncommitment timing strategies and real options
Year of publication: |
December 2017
|
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Authors: | Hori, Keiichi ; Osano, Hiroshi |
Published in: |
The Japanese economic review : the journal of the Japanese Economic Association. - Richmond, Vic. : Wiley, ISSN 1352-4739, ZDB-ID 1335724-4. - Vol. 68.2017, 4, p. 521-554
|
Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Kündigung | Dismissal | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Entscheidungstheorie | Decision theory | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
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