AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium : Part II ; from PBE to sequential equilibrium

Giacomo Bonanno

In [5] (Int. J. Game Theory, 42:567-592, 2013) a general notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) was introduced for extensive-form games and shown to be intermediate between subgame-perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. The essential ingredient of the proposed notion is the existence of a plausibility order on the set of histories that rationalizes a given assessment. In this paper we study restrictions on the belief revision policy encoded in a plausibility order and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a PBE to be a sequential equilibrium.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Bonanno, Giacomo
Publisher:	Davis, Calif. : Dep. of Economics, Univ. of California
Subject:	plausibility order \| belief revision \| Bayesian updating \| independence \| sequential equilibrium \| consistency \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Bayes-Statistik \| Bayesian inference \| Gleichgewichtstheorie \| Equilibrium theory