All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyerseller exact representative.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Oliva, Marina Nunez
Institutions:	Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona
Subject:	core \| nucleolus \| assignment game \| kernel

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Series:	Working Papers in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Documents de Treball Number 114 13 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005022346