All-Pay Auctions with Budget Constraints

Consider an all-pay auction with interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. We characterize a symmetric equilibrium for the case of two players. In contrast with the second-price auction, making budgets more severe can depress the bids of unconstrained bidders

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Year of publication:	2011-03-20
Authors:	Kotowski, Maciej ; Li, Fei
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	All-Pay Auction \| Budget Constraints \| Lobbying \| War of Attrition \| Common Values \| Private Values

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009004809