Ambiguity and perceived coordination in a global game

In a global game, larger ambiguity is shown to decrease the amount of coordination each player perceives. Consequently, small uncertainty tends to select the Pareto dominated equilibrium of the game without uncertainty. Implications for models of financial crises are drawn.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Laskar, Daniel
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 122.2014, 2, p. 317-320
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Global game \| Ambiguity \| Coordination \| Equilibrium selection \| Financial crises

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G01 - Financial Crises
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743716