An agents establishes trust with equitable information revelation
Negotiation is an information exchange process as wellas an offer exchange process. Theories of competitive negotiationare typically founded on game theory where theagent?s utility function is the focus. If an agent is uncertainof the integrity of its information then it may not knowits utility with certainty. Here what an agent knows and howcertain it is of what it knows are modelled using tools frominformation theory that are applied to value information. Anagent attempts to instil a sense trust in its opponent by revealinginformation of comparable ?value? in its responsesto that which it has received. Each proposal and claim exchangedreveals valuable information about the sender?sposition. A negotiation may break down if an agent believesthat its opponent is not playing fairly. The agent aims togive the impression of fair play by responding with comparableinformation revelation whilst playing strategically toinfluence its opponent?s preferences with claims. The agentmakes no assumptions about the internals of its opponent,including her motivations, logic, and whether she is consciousof a utility function.
Year of publication: |
2005
|
---|---|
Authors: | Debenham John ; Simoff Simeon |
Publisher: |
The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers Inc (IEEE) |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Exchange rate modelling using news articles and economic data
Zhang Debbie, (2005)
-
A foundation for informed negotiation
Debenham John, (2006)
-
Investigating e-Market Evolution
Debenham John, (2002)
- More ...