An Algorithm for Identifying Agent-k-linked Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities

We consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains, and observe that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Andersson, Tommy ; Ehlers, Lars
Publisher:	Lund : Lund University, School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics
Subject:	least manipulable envy-free rules \| algorithm

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Series:	Working Paper ; 2014:35
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	798979240 [GVK] hdl:10419/260131 [Handle] RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2014_035 [RePEc]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208702