An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities

We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked allocations. This note provides an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	ANDERSSON, Tommy ; EHLERS, Lars
Institutions:	Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de Montréal
Subject:	Least manipulable envy-free rules \| algorithm

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cahiers de recherche.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	8 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011186244