An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy-free and budget-balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities

Tommy Andersson, Lars Ehlers

Year of publication:	January 2021
Authors:	Andersson, Tommy ; Ehlers, Lars H.
Publisher:	Lund : Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University
Subject:	Envy-freeness \| Budget-balance \| Least manipulable \| Algorithm \| Theorie \| Theory \| Algorithmus \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Manipulation \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function

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