An Alternative Algorithm for Identifying Free Riders Based on a No-Free-Rider Nash Equilibrium

In identifying the free riders in the voluntary provision of a pure public good, Andreoni and McGuire (1993) simplify Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian's (1986)algorithm by systematizing the selection process of potential contributors. We propose an alternative algorithm in which a concept of no-free-rider Nash equilibrium is utilized to identify potentially a large fraction of free riders in Nash equilibrium without conducting any Nash solution tests for them.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Shrestha, Ratna K. ; Cheong, Kwang Soo
Published in:	FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis. - ISSN 0015-2218. - Vol. 63.2007, 2, p. 278-284
Subject:	public goods \| free riders \| algorithm \| no-free-rider Nash equilibrium

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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