An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities
Year of publication: |
March 15, 2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Daddario, Tatiana ; MacLean, Richard P. ; Postlewaite, Andrew |
Publisher: |
Philadelphia, PA : Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania |
Subject: | Zuordnungsproblem | Assignment problem | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Externer Effekt | Externalities | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory |
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