An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property

In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness property. This property states that if to a game we add another game in which two players are symmetric then their payoffs change by the same amount. We show that the Shapley value is characterized by this fairness property, efficiency and the null player property. These three axioms also characterize the Shapley value on the class of simple games.

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Year of publication:	2002-03-20
Authors:	Brink, René van den
Published in:	International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 30.2002, 3, p. 309-319
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	TU-game \| Shapley value \| fairness \| simple games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005598402