An Empirical Comparison of Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories in 3-Person Sidepayment Games
Year of publication: |
1998
|
---|---|
Authors: | Michener, H. ; Myers, Daniel |
Published in: |
Theory and Decision. - Springer. - Vol. 45.1998, 1, p. 37-82
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | n-person games | Cooperative games | Central-union theory | Equal excess model | Myerson–Shapley solution | Kernel |
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