An equilibrium model of incentive contracts in the presence of information manipulation
Eitan Goldman; Steve L. Slezak
| Year of publication: |
2006
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Goldman, Eitan ; Slezak, Steve L. |
| Published in: |
Journal of financial economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-405X, ZDB-ID 187118-3. - Vol. 80.2006, 3, p. 603-626
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| Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Governance-Ansatz | Governance approach | Betrug | Fraud |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003331360