An Examination of the Market for Favors and Votes in Congress.
This paper examines the strategies that 'horse traders' and 'power brokers' adopt in trading favors to pass legislation. Although the favors that they trade are generally impossible to observe, the paper develops a model that allows tests of favor trading. With data from the Senate vote on the Byrd Amendment to the 1990 Clean Air Act, the author conducts such a test. The test provides evidence that, on this vote, favor trading occurred, the coalition leaders practiced price discrimination, and the coalition leaders did not collude with one another. Copyright 1996 by Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
1996
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Authors: | Groseclose, Tim |
Published in: |
Economic Inquiry. - Western Economic Association International - WEAI. - Vol. 34.1996, 2, p. 320-40
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Publisher: |
Western Economic Association International - WEAI |
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