An Experimental Analysis of Informational Feedback and Commitment

In this paper we experimentally manipulate the informational feedback and the technology used in two team production games. Production functions are aggregative (a standard linear VCM) or weak link (the minimum or weakest link game, WLM). We analyze two informational conditions, relative to a Baseline (BSL) in which the unique available information is the relevant statistic (team average and team minimum). In the Full Information (FI) condition, subjects get the ranked vector of contributions. In the Traceable Full Information (TFI) condition, subjects are able to trace back individual contributions over time. Our 2x3 factorial design keeps identical full anonymity and full privacy rules in all six experimental treatments. Our results suggest that information matters in a non-linear way, as no significant differences are observed between BSL and FI in any game. High contribution rates are only sustained in the WLM with traceable full information. These differences are consistent with very different commitment patterns across informational conditions. More interestingly, conditional cooperation patterns are shaped by information and commitment rather than by the technology.