An experimental investigation of a third-person enforcement in a prisoner’s dilemma game

We experimentally study the effect of a third-person enforcement on a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game played by two persons, with whom the third person plays repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. We find that when the third person can observe these two persons’ play, the possibility of the third person’s future punishment causes them to cooperate in the one-shot game.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Kusakawa, Takao ; Ogawa, Kazuhito ; Shichijo, Tatsuhiro
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 117.2012, 3, p. 704-707
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Third person \| Infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma \| Cooperation \| Experiment

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594166