An extension of a theorem on the aggregation of separable preferences

An Excess-Voting Function relative to a profile assigns to each pair of alternatives (x,y), the number of voters who prefer x to y minus the number of voters who prefer y to x. It is shown that any non-binary separable Excess-Voting Function can be achieved from a preferences profile when individuals are endowed with separable preferences. This result is an extension of Hollard and Le Breton (1996).

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1998-11-16
Authors:	Vidu, Laurent
Published in:	Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 16.1999, 1, p. 159-167
Publisher:	Springer

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: 16 December 1996 / Accepted: 8 October 1997
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005147160