An Impossibility in Sequencing Problems

A set of agents with different waiting costs have to receive a service of different length of time from a single provider which can serve only one agent at a time. One needs to form a queue and set up monetary transfers to compensate the agents who have to wait. We prove that no rule satisfies efficiency of queues and coalitional strategy-proofness.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Çağatay, Kayi ; Eve, Ramaekers
Institutions:	Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE), School of Business and Economics
Subject:	mathematical economics

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Research Memorandum.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Research Memoranda Number 040
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011160316