An incentive mechanism for private parking-sharing programs in an imperfect information setting
Pengyu Yan, Xiaoqiang Cai, Feng Chu, Debing Ni, Heng He
| Year of publication: |
2023
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Yan, Pengyu ; Cai, Xiaoqiang ; Chu, Feng ; Ni, Debing ; He, Heng |
| Published in: |
Service science. - Hanover, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 2164-3970, ZDB-ID 2658448-7. - Vol. 15.2023, 1, p. 3-21
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| Subject: | incentive compatibility | mechanism design | parking sharing | truth-telling pricing | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Anreizregulierung | Incentive regulation |
Online Resource
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1287/serv.2022.0303 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014293780