An Online Appendix to 'Quadratic Voting : How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy'

This online appendix proves the central result in Lalley and Weyl (Forthcoming). The full text PDF for "Qaudratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy" may be found here: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2003531

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Lalley, Steven ; Weyl, E. Glen
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Demokratie \| Democracy \| Wahlverhalten \| Voting behaviour \| Mechanismus-Design-Theorie \| Mechanism design \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Abstimmungsregel \| Voting rule

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (2 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 24, 2017 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2790624 [DOI]
Classification:	d47 ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H41 - Public Goods ; P16 - Political Economy
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014126996