An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games
Year of publication: |
2012-05-23
|
---|---|
Authors: | Béal, Sylvain ; Rémila, Eric ; Solal, Philippe |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
Subject: | Core | Block | Weak dominance relation | Strong dominance relation | Davis-Maschler reduced games |
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