An Overlapping Generations Model of Taxpayer Bailouts of Banks

The paper constructs an overlapping generations model to evaluate how different bank rescue plans affect banks' risk-taking incentives. For a non-competitive banking industry, we find bailout with tax imposed on the old generation or equity bail-in to be efficient policies in the sense that they implement socially optimal risk-taking. In a competitive banking sector, no-bailout implements the socially-optimal risk-taking. Bailout policies financed by a tax imposed on the young generation always induce excessive risk-taking

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Shy, Oz
Other Persons:	Stenbacka, Rune (contributor)
Publisher:	[2017]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Overlapping Generations \| Overlapping generations \| Theorie \| Theory \| Schuldenübernahme \| Bailout \| Bankinsolvenz \| Bank failure \| Bankenregulierung \| Bank regulation \| Bankenkrise \| Banking crisis \| Bank

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Commentary

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012969915