An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
Dieter Balkenborg, Miltiadis Makris
| Year of publication: |
May 2015
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Balkenborg, Dieter ; Makrēs, Miltiadēs |
| Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 157.2015, p. 918-958
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| Subject: | Mechanism design | Informed principal | Common values | Neutral optimum | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jet.2015.02.007 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011525357