NGA (Next generation access) investments, having an increased pace in recent years, bring out many regulatory responses globally. Regulation in this area, being nascent, responds different aims and concerns comparing to those that had stake during liberalisation period. Yet, some continuing concerns still reside in EU policies which are engaged with harmonisation as well as achieving competition even in emerging markets. While the competitive achievements in EU are wide-spread with a variety of technologies and access models, EU countries now are confronted with the side-effects of this type of regulatory approach that extended to NGA sphere, suffering with an entrenched regulatory approach still going on. In other words, throughout transition from copper to fibre platforms, EU did not change its attitude so much, even if not revealing the same kind of conventional wisdom of imposing all the obligations to operators having SMP (significant market power). The lastly adopted Recommendation on Non-Discrimination and Costing Methodologies, representing a mid-way between the conventional (copper-based) approach and the deregulation existing in US, included a fine-tuning over the ‘ladder of investment’ approach pursued for around a decade. While Commission determines that fibre loops built by SMP operators are to be granted third party access via cost-oriented prices in principle, the so-called new Recommendation seems to leave a number of harbours to relax this pricing obligation in the emerging NGA environment, e.g., via a replacing margin-squeeze test. Yet, the Commission’s determination towards achieving open access with regard to all available levels of the newly-built fibre platforms brings out some suspects about the effectiveness of the so-called approach of fine-tuning. In effect, a little leeway seems to be given to the NGA investors who will come out of the incumbents in the light of past experiences. Although total amount of investments realised by the alternative operators thus far exceeded those of incumbents in EU, there is a real unused potential on part of main stakeholders, particularly fixed incumbents. Forthcoming safeguards that give way to symmetric access obligations to existing passive (ducts, conduits, manholes, etc.) and inner-building fibre networks as well as more effectuated rights of way also fall insufficient to unveil such potential, which is apparently linked to a clear-cut framework that would attract investments specifically by allowing first-mover advantages (for rate-of-return purposes). However, there is not yet such a picture drawn by the EU NGA policy, which falls disaggregated and fragile to the extent it warrants regulatory micro-management driving up to all possible business models. Main problem of the EU policy-making is the lack of strong and simplistic signals to be given to the industry, which could trigger the potential for NGA investments. Out of the existing and forthcoming regulatory steps, the flexibility allowed for pricing wholesale access products could not capably fill the gap to accomplish 2020 Digital Agenda (DAE) targets, which clearly require more than fine-tuning. In this paper, first EU broadband policies are reviewed from the beginning to the current regulatory approach for NGA. Afterwards, 2020 DAE targets are analysed within the general context of EU NGA policy in conjunction with the recent fine-tuning approach. The paper concludes that the fine-tuning envisaged in the 2013 Recommendation as well as the forthcoming Single Telecom Market Regulation that suggests deeper and more centralised regulation in many areas of NGA environment, e.g., virtual broadband remedies, give an intricate signal to the industry. By contrast, the paper suggests that intrinsic need of the industry is still overlooked as there is no focus on the investments to be led by the big stakeholders by means of granting first-mover advantages to them during a reasonable rate-of-return period. Another finding within the paper is that the policy ground and the tools, by which the EU authorities elaborate NGA policy prospects, are far from offering concrete milestones but yielding out more possibilities with a narrow 'margin of depreciation' left for the market actors. Last but not least, in order for EU policies to respond the required NGA supply chain, a certain relinquishment out of the declared conflicting aims is essential along with a more simplistic form of regulation
