Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability

We compare the manipulability of different choice rules by considering the number of manipulable profiles. We establish the minimal number of such profiles for tops-only, anonymous, and surjective choice rules, and show that this number is attained by unanimity rules with status quo.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Maus, Stefan ; Peters, Hans ; Storcken, Ton
Institutions:	Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization
Subject:	public economics

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Research Memoranda.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Research Memoranda Number 009
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005304980