Another proof that assignment games have singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Wako, Jun |
Published in: |
Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 29.2006, 1, p. 213-217
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Assignment game | Complementary slackness | Core | Matching |
-
On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games
Atay, Ata, (2018)
-
THE ROLE PLAYED BY SIMPLE OUTCOMES IN COALITION FORMATION PROCESS OF THE CORE OUTCOMES
Sotomayor, Marilda, (2012)
-
Pérez-Castrillo, J. David, (2023)
- More ...
-
A note on the competitive allocations in a market with indivisible goods
Wako, Jun, (1994)
-
Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods
Wako, Jun, (2005)
-
Wako, Jun, (2006)
- More ...