Anticipating moral hazard undermines climate mitigation in an experimental geoengineering game
Talbot M. Andrews, Andrew W. Delton, Reuben Kline
| Year of publication: |
2022
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Andrews, Talbot M. ; Delton, Andrew W. ; Kline, Reuben |
| Published in: |
Ecological economics : the transdisciplinary journal of the International Society for Ecological Economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0921-8009, ZDB-ID 1002942-4. - Vol. 196.2022, p. 1-8
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| Subject: | Experiments | Geoengineering | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Experiment | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Klimawandel | Climate change | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Klimaschutz | Climate protection |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2022.107421 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013503507