Application of Coase Theorem to Analyze the Welfare Gain and Loss in a Conflict of Herders’ Damage in Croppers’ Land at the Adamawa Region of Cameroon

By applying the Coase theorem, this paper attempts to solve a conflict of land management between croppers producing maize on land and herders who breed cattle that needs land to graze on in the Adamawa region of Cameroon. The results indicate that, the herders commit maximum damage when their cattle destroys 3 tons/ha of maize and a compromise is reached when 1.2 tons/ha of crops are damaged. At the latter point, the socially efficient damage is achieved because the herders’ marginal benefit is equal to the croppers’ marginal damage cost (120 million FCFA/ha), so that the net social benefit is 48 million FCFA/ha. From the socially efficient damage, any one ton increase or decrease of crops’ damage would induce the net social benefit to decline from 48 to 14.66 million FCFA/ha. Hence, to safeguard a socially efficient welfare, the government should encourage negotiated solutions between herders and croppers in such region where integrated crop-livestock farming systems are common.