Application of the Auction Principles in Oligopolistic Models

We consider a general auction model with infinitely divisible commodity and price functions and give a new existence result in the case of the unbounded feasible set. We show that equilibrium states in the Cournot oligopoly can be attained via this auction mechanism. This property holds also true in the case of joint constraints for players, when they become mutually dependent. We deduce a new existence result for oligopolistic problems from that for the general auction one

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Konnov, Igor
Publisher:	[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Oligopol \| Oligopoly \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Auktion \| Auction

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