Approximation Results for Discontinuous Games with an Application to Equilibrium Refinement

We provide approximation results for Nash equilibria in possibly discontinuous games when payoffs and strategy sets are perturbed. We then prove existence results for a new "finitistic" infinite-game generalization of Selten's [24] notion of perfection, and study some of its properties. The existence results, which rely on the approximation theorems, relate existing notions of perfection to the new specification.

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Year of publication:	2012-10-11
Authors:	Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol ; McLean, Richard
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Rutgers University-New Brunswick
Subject:	discontinuous game \| Nash equilibrium correspondence \| better-reply security \| equilibrium refinement \| limit-of-finite perfect equilibrium

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Series:	Departmental Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Forthcoming in Economic Theory 20 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010607668