Are Discretionary Accounting and Finance Choices Made to Address Management Control Concerns by Influencing Organizational Actions?

This study examines whether senior managers' discretionary accounting and finance choices are selected to influence the business decisions of subordinate managers and employees. We predict these choices are used to address internal management concerns by strategically shaping the information faced by subordinates in subsequent decision tasks. This strategic shaping of the decision environment can be used to influence, or nudge, subordinate decisions in an organizationally-desired direction (Thaler and Sunstein 2003; 2008). Our focus on internal business goals contrasts with prior research on the determinants of accounting choice that focus on external reporting goals. We predict and find in two experiments that experienced senior managers make discretionary accounting and finance choices in contemplation of the choices' influence on the decisions of subordinates and to promote internal, organizationally desirable decisions. Interestingly, this finding arises despite the fact that managers often must forego higher near-term earnings and cash flows to promote such decisions. We also investigate the efficacy of using these choices to influence subordinates' decisions, and find that these accounting and finance choices do influence lower-level managers' decisions toward actions desired by upper management