Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?

Using options- and press-based proxies for CEO overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate 2005a, 2005b, 2008), we find that over the 1993-2003 period, firms with overconfident CEOs have greater return volatility, invest more in innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for given research and development (R&D) expenditure. Overconfident managers only achieve greater innovation than non-overconfident managers in innovative industries. Overconfidence is not associated with lower sales, ROA, or Q.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2010-04-29
Authors:	Hirshleifer, David ; Low, Angie ; Teoh, Siew Hong

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Hirshleifer, David and Low, Angie and Teoh, Siew Hong (2010): Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?
Classification:	M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) ; G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General ; M40 - Accounting and Auditing. General
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015221408