Arrovian efficiency and auditability in discrete mechanism design
Marek Pycia and M. Utku Ünver
| Year of publication: |
10 January 2022
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Pycia, Marek ; Ünver, M. Utku |
| Publisher: |
London : Centre for Economic Policy Research |
| Subject: | Strategy-proofness | Pareto efficiency | Arrovian preference aggregation | auditability | non-bossiness | voting | house allocation | Pareto-Optimum | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Allokation | Allocation | Wirtschaftsprüfung | Financial audit | Unmöglichkeitstheorem | Impossibility theorem | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Effizienz | Efficiency | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Aggregation |
| Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten) Illustrationen |
|---|---|
| Series: | Discussion papers / CEPR. - London : CEPR, ISSN 2045-6573, ZDB-ID 2001019-9. - Vol. DP16872 |
| Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012797467