Arrovian efficiency and auditability in the allocation of discrete resources
Year of publication: |
17 October 2020
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Authors: | Pycia, Marek ; Ünver, M. Utku |
Publisher: |
London : Centre for Economic Policy Research |
Subject: | Individual strategy-proofness | group strategy-proofness | Pareto efficiency | Arrovian preference aggregation | matching | no-transfer allocation and exchange | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Pareto-Optimum | Allokation | Allocation | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten) Illustrationen |
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Series: | Discussion papers / CEPR. - London : CEPR, ZDB-ID 2001019-9. - Vol. DP15377 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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