Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents

This article studies different methods of assigning a good to budget-constrained agents. Schemes that assign the good randomly and allow resale may outperform the competitive market in terms of Utilitarian efficiency. The socially optimal mechanism involves random assignment at a discount--an in-kind subsidy--and a cash incentive to discourage low-valuation individuals from claiming the good. Copyright , Oxford University Press.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Che, Yeon-Koo ; Gale, Ian ; Kim, Jinwoo
Published in:	Review of Economic Studies. - Oxford University Press. - Vol. 80.2013, 1, p. 73-107
Publisher:	Oxford University Press

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010638015