Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents
This article studies different methods of assigning a good to budget-constrained agents. Schemes that assign the good randomly and allow resale may outperform the competitive market in terms of Utilitarian efficiency. The socially optimal mechanism involves random assignment at a discount--an in-kind subsidy--and a cash incentive to discourage low-valuation individuals from claiming the good. Copyright , Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Che, Yeon-Koo ; Gale, Ian ; Kim, Jinwoo |
Published in: |
Review of Economic Studies. - Oxford University Press. - Vol. 80.2013, 1, p. 73-107
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Publisher: |
Oxford University Press |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
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