Assignment mechanisms under distributional constraints
Year of publication: |
2020
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ashlagi, Itai ; Saberi, Amin ; Shameli, Ali |
Published in: |
Operations research. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0030-364X, ZDB-ID 123389-0. - Vol. 68.2020, 2, p. 467-479
|
Subject: | analysis of algorithms | Games, Information, and Networks | market design | assignment | matching | refugee | strategyproof | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Matching | Algorithmus | Algorithm | Allokation | Allocation | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism | Flüchtlinge | Refugees |
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