Assignment models and reneging

We consider a non-cooperative assignment model where we show that any subgame perfect equilibrium is stable, and that an appropriate refinement criterion leads to the p-optimal outcome. We then consider a model with reneging and derive some interesting properties of this game. We show that in this case `unraveling' may occur. Furthermore, the resulting outcome can be either stable, or unstable.

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Year of publication:	1999-08-24
Authors:	Chowdhury, Prabal Roy
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 14.1999, 2, p. 393-415
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Assignment models \| Reneging \| Stability

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: July 1, 1997; revised version: May 30, 1998
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753247