Asymmetric contests with risky rents
We study a rent-seeking proprtional-prize contest between two heterogeneously risk-averse players and given prize amounts are normally distributed rather than known ex ante. We establish existence and unicity of a Nash equilibrium linked to this contest, and study the equilibrium e_orts implied. We then obtain a similar equilibrium result for a winner-takes-all lottery contest within the same risky rent context, and compare optimal e_orts as well as expected utilities between the two contest types.
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Guigou, Jean-Daniel ; Lovat, Bruno ; Boissaux, Marc |
Institutions: | Luxembourg School of Finance, Faculté de droit, d'économie et de finance |
Saved in:
freely available
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