Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure
Year of publication: |
[2018]
|
---|---|
Authors: | Moriya, Fumitoshi ; Yamashita, Takuro |
Publisher: |
[Toulouse] : Toulouse School of Economics |
Subject: | Moral hazard | Unique implementation | Asymmetric information allocation | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Moral Hazard | Allokation | Allocation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection |
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