Asymmetric information may protect the commons : the welfare benefits of uninformed regulators
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Espinola-Arredondo, Ana ; Muñoz-García, Félix |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 121.2013, 3, p. 463-467
|
Subject: | Entry deterrence | Signaling | Commons | Welfare | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory | Markteintritt | Market entry | Wohlfahrtsanalyse | Welfare analysis | Signalling | Gemeingüter |
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